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This paper studies the Viking age – the roughly 300 year period beginning in 800 AD – 
from the perspective of the economics of conflict.  The Viking age is interesting because 
throughout the time period, the scale of conflict increased – small scale raiding behaviour 
eventually evolved into large scale clashes between armies.  With this observation in 
mind, we present a theoretical model describing the incentives both the defending 
population and the invading population had to agglomerate into larger groups to better 
defend against attacks, and engage in attacks, respectively.  The result is what might be 
called a theory of competitive agglomeration.  We also apply our model in assessing the 
factors behind the onset of Vikings raids at the end of the 8
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† The title of this paper is inspired by the title of P. H. Sawyer’s (1994) book “Kings and Vikings: 
Scandinavia and Europe AD 700 – 1100, ” which we felt to be an apt description of the approach taken in 
this paper.     3
 
 
“For what are thieves’ purchases but little kingdoms, for in theft the 
hands of the underlings are directed by the commander, the confederacy 
of them is sworn together, and the pillage is shared by law amongst them? 
And if those ragamuffins grow up to be able to keep enough forts, build 
habitations, possess cities, and conquer adjoining nations, then their 
government is no more called thievish, but graced with the eminent name 
of a kingdom, given and gotten, not because they have left their practices, 
not because they have left their practices, but because they may now use 
them without danger of law.”  
 




I.  Introduction 
Since the early 1990s an important literature on the causes and intensity of conflict has 
emerged.  Initiated by seminal work of Hirshleifer (1991, 1995) and Grossman (1991; see 
also Grossman and Kim 1995), several analysts have considered how rational (albeit 
myopic) agents allocate their endowments across productive and appropriative activities 
to maximize their payoffs. Since conflict, in various forms, has played a major role 
throughout human history – shaping the development trajectory of civilization – 
improving our understanding of the nature of conflict appears extremely useful. 
A slightly awkward feature of the conflict literature is its focus on static 
modeling. While, arguably, there are examples where opponents contest a prize during 
one instant and return to their usual business (or similarly, examples where conflict may 
be approximated by a near ‘steady state outcome’ with ongoing and unchanging conflict), 
there are many other cases where the nature of conflict evolves over time. Conflicts may 
evolve because technologies and relative prices change due to some endogenous or 
exogenous process, or because the incentives to behave in a certain fashion are subject to 
change. In this paper we adopt the latter perspective, and discuss the incentives for agents 
to agglomerate into larger groups. Agglomeration may enable parties to better defend 
themselves from aggressors, or to better exploit their weaker neighbors. The result is 
what can be called a theory of competitive agglomeration.     4
Our approach was motivated by the insight that dealing with issues of provision 
of defense and exploitation of neighbors was one of the primary reasons for governments 
and larger political groups to form in the first place.  In this way, our theory contributes 
to the literature on the optimal size of political jurisdictions, providing an alternative 
angle to explain the development of nation states (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 
2005a,b).  Like these theories, scale economies are at the heart of our story, and optimal 
nation size is determined by balancing benefits and costs of increasing the jurisdiction.  
Unlike other theories, however, our dynamic theory of agglomeration springs directly 
from the nature of the conflict technology, and not from an assumption about fixed costs 
in the provision of certain public goods.  In fact, we show that the degree of 
agglomeration – a measure of the optimal size of a jurisdiction – depends upon the 
technology by which defenders and invaders interact.  In essence we aim to provide a 
natural link between two strands of literature – analytical work on the size of nations (e.g. 
Friedman 1977, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Spolaore 1997) and on arms races 
(Schelling 1960, Sandler and Hartley 1995). 
While we hope our theory is useful in understanding the basic forces driving 
agglomeration in the face of conflict in a general setting, we shall discuss our theory in 
terms of a particularly dramatic episode in history: the era of the Viking invasions. The 
Viking invasions are an interesting and in many ways ideal episode within which to study 
agglomeration: only through effectively forming larger groups could European 
settlements deal with Viking raids, while at the same time Viking invasions evolved over 
time from small, disorganized attacks into large, organized invasions. Our theory also 
allows us to consider various hypotheses as to how the invasions got started in the first 
place (see section II for details).  In this paper we focus on these early days and on the 
development towards the high of the Viking invasions. While we don’t analyze explicitly 
the end of the Viking era, the model can be used to shed some light on this matter as well. 
  Our model differs from much of the previous literature on economic conflict for a 
number of reasons. First and foremost, as mentioned above, we focus on agglomeration.  
Second, we explicitly consider the dynamics of this process. Others in the conflict 
literature (most notably perhaps, Skaperdas 1992 and Hirshleifer 1995) have considered 
“reaction functions” of players – an approach that is at least implicitly dynamic insofar   5
that it allows analyzing the behavior of the system when it is out-of-equilibrium.  But we 
extend this approach and trace an explicit expression for the system’s dynamics by 
introducing a measure of friction or inertia.  Time becomes a variable in the model and 
the system is amenable to conventional stability analysis and calibration exercises.
1 
Third, in our asymmetric model aggression can only flow one way – from a potential 
aggressor (the Vikings) to a potential victim (the British). This unidirectional focus 
implies comfortable middle ground between existing vertical models of conflict (e.g. 
insurrections and rebellion: the ruler versus the people – see for example Grossman 1991) 
and horizontal models of conflict (where tribes or agents compete for each other’s output 
– e.g. Baker 2003), and also allows analyzing the decision of aggressors to participate in 
conflict. Finally, unlike most models of conflict our specification of the conflict process 
results in a model that is fully tractable.  This applies both to a ‘stripped down’ version of 
the model as presented in the main text to illustrate the main story with as little 
distractions as possible, and to more elaborate specifications provided in three separate 
appendices that serve as robustness analyses. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In section II we provide a short history of the 
Vikings, fleshing out some of the more pertinent stylized facts and honing in on some of 
the gruesome details. Section III introduces notation and sketches the bare bones of the 
basic model.  In section IV we consider the relatively easy case where villages can 
‘agglomerate’ in coalitions to improve their oomph in contests, but where the level of 
their contribution to the coalition is fixed.  In section V we allow villages to optimally 
choose their contribution (bearing in mind that investing in conflict effort comes at a 
cost).  This allows us to trace out the full dynamic system, and analyze its properties.  
Section VI, finally, concludes. 
 
II.  The Vikings are coming! 
  While our model can be applied to other interactions between populations of 
aggressors and defenders, the Viking age (roughly, the 300-year period beginning in c. 
                                                 
1 The analysis is not fully dynamic in the sense that we do not start out with equations of motion to keep 
track of the evolution of some state variables.  See Maxwell and Reuveny (2005) for the only analysis in 
the conflict literature that we aware of to follow this route.  They develop a model where bands of myopic 
agents share access to a common pool.  Both human fertility and resource dynamics are defined by 
differential equations, allowing a full analysis of the system’s dynamics.   6
800 AD) is a convenient stage upon which to discuss the basic logic of our model for two 
reasons. First, the historical events surrounding the arrival and onset of Viking invaders 
are well documented. Second, the intentions of the parties involved (at least in the early 
part of the Viking age) were clear: Viking invaders were interested in acquiring wealth of 
the societies they victimized,
2 while the main interest of potential victims was in stopping 
the Viking raiders from doing this.
3    
  Like most historical epochs, pinning down an exact beginning and ending date for 
the Viking age is difficult, but historians agree that a good starting point is the raid on 
Lindesfarne, on the coast of Northumbria, on June 8
th, 793. Shortly thereafter, Vikings 
turned up in a variety of places in the British Isles, including Wearmouth (794), Iona 
(795), North Ireland (795), Scotland and the Isle of Man (797); and branched out to other 
coastal regions of Europe, appearing off the coast of Frisia and Aquitaine (799), the 
Faroes (800), and, once again, Iona (802).
4 Why did the Viking onset begin at the precise 
moment it did? A host of explanations have been proposed (which we comment on 
below), including poor climate and deteriorating hunting and fishing conditions, growing 
internal strife, population pressure, increased commerce and prosperity in Northwestern 
Europe, advances in boat-building and sailing technology, and even boredom at home 
(Griffith 1995, Sawyer 1997).   
  Initial raids were directed primarily at coastal targets and conducted by relatively 
small fleets; while raids were certainly harrowing experiences for the victims,
5 setbacks 
were not uncommon among raiders groups.
6 Over time Viking attacks evolved into 
                                                 
2 Griffith (1995: 22) writes: “…the primary purpose of the marauding armies emanating from Scandinavia 
during the Viking era was probably seen to be less a matter of fighting battles than of pure economic 
activity – i. e. raising money by the easiest means.” 
3 Much recent scholarship has been devoted to stressing other aspects of the Viking expansion by focusing 
on the trading, farming, and colonization activities that occurred simultaneously with Viking raids.  
4 These dates are drawn from Poertner (1971). 
5 How harrowing is a subject of some debate. The details of raids are primarily known through the writings 
of Churchmen, who were certainly not in a position to provide a balanced account of raids. It is hard to 
know how much credence should be given to barbaric behaviors allegedly practiced by the Vikings such as 
the “blood-eagle” – the practice to crack a victim’s ribcage with an axe, pull out the lungs, and flap them 
like a pair of wings above one’s head.  Recent opinion has swayed in the other direction; for example, 
Keynes (1997: 49) writes “…it is now more fashionable to regard [the Vikings] as maligned and 
misunderstood.” Sawyer (1995) is one among those who argue that Vikings weren’t any more violent than 
other medieval peoples.  
6 Sawyer (1994: 81) reports “…the raiders who attacked Jarrow in 794 suffered casualties, and the Franks 
prevented the raiders of 820 from doing much damage until they reached the coast. The Irish also had their 
successes – in 811 in Ulster, and in 812 in both Connaught and Kerry.”     7
bolder, better-organized and larger enterprises,
7 so much so that by the mid 9
th century, 
Viking armies were conducting organized, large-scale invasions. Sawyer (1995: 81) 
writes: “In the summer of 834, the great market of Dorestad, some 80km from the sea, 
was attacked…and a new phase of Viking activity in Western Europe began.” Large 
Viking forces appeared in Sheppey, on the Thames river, along the coast by Antwerp, in 
the interior of Ireland, and in the Bristol Channel; Dorestad was attacked again in 836. 
Viking fleets raided the Seine river basin in 841, and Hamburg in 845, led by the Danish 
King, Horik (Sawyer 1995). Viking forces attacked Nantes in 842, Seville in 844, and 
even Pisa in 859 (Roberts 1993).  
  How did the victims respond to these attacks? A broad trend towards 
agglomeration into larger and better-organized political units slowly took shape across 
Europe. On mainland Europe, for example, Louis the Pious, the Frankish king during the 
early part of the 9
th century, took initial steps in organizing coastal defenses, although 
these efforts were cut short by his death. Some years later (in 862), Charles put into 
motion a program of building bridges and fortresses at critical points along rivers. 
  When the Vikings first attacked Lindesfarne, England was composed of a 
multitude of small kingdoms (Abels 1988b).
8 Early Viking raids focused on monasteries 
and churches (compounding the horror of the victims), and were typically undertaken by 
small fleets. As the Vikings grew better organized, even to the extent of constructing 
semi-permanent bases in the British Isles, attacks grew larger. In 851 a 350-ship force 
attacked Canterbury and London. Raiding forces did suffer setbacks; Aethelstan (ruler of 
Kent and other parts of Southeastern England), defeated the aforementioned force at sea 
(Kirby 1992),
9 suggesting that the size, organization, and skill of defenders had kept pace 
with the size of the raiding parties. The success was apparently short-lived, as new and 
larger Viking armies arrived in England, which “seriously began to threaten the 
                                                 
7 Sawyer (1994) attributes the initial impetus towards larger, more ambitious attacks to lapses in defenses 
caused by disputes about the division of the Frankish empire after the death of Louis the Pious. In chapter 6 
of his book, Sawyer (1994) describes the Viking knack for showing up in areas afflicted by civil strife and 
disorganization. See also Sawyer (1997) and Griffith (1995) on the increasing scale of Viking attacks.  
8 Kirby (1992) refers to the historical tradition of “heptarchy” of English Kingdoms existing prior to the 
Viking age, but argues that in fact this was almost certainly a gross overstatement of the degree of 
centralization in pre-Viking England.  
9 Kirby (1992: 172) writes that the Anglo-Saxon chronicle records this loss as “the greatest slaughter of a 
heathen army ever yet heard of.”    8
capabilities of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms.” (Kirby 1992: 172).  The large and nomadic 
“Great Army,” (see Keynes 1997 for a good account of the Great Army’s activities) 
which arrived in England in 865, took on a sort of momentum all its own, conquering 
substantial parts of England, and crossing over to France later in the 9
th century, where it 
only disbanded some 30 years after forming.  
In spite of the growing organizational capabilities of Viking raiders, defensive 
forces over time learned how to deal with the problems posed by large-scale Viking 
invasions, largely by combining into larger administrative units capable of maintaining 
concerted defenses. Sawyer (1997: 10) writes: “By 870 there had been profound changes 
in Frankia and in England.” The achievements of Alfred the Great and the West Saxon 
dynasty in the late 9
th century were particularly notable; under Alfred, a centralized 
system of forts and coastal defenses (the burghal system) were constructed. The 
fortresses overlooked virtually the entire landscape of the West Saxon kingdom, and 
served both as fortified points for defense of the local populace, blocked passage to 
rivers, and also served as launching points for permanently garrisoned defensive armies; 
the system also aided in consolidating centralized rule.
10 On the continent, similar 
developments occurred. Viking armies were defeated in pitched battles in Saucourt (881), 
and near Louvain in 891. Sawyer (1997: 14) writes that “for most of the tenth century, 
opportunities for Vikings were limited…because the best targets were defended by 
fortifications or organized armies,” noting further that “only large-scale invasions offered 
any hope of significant success.”  
As Viking raids evolved into larger-scale affairs, so evolved the scale of society in 
Scandinavia. Sawyer (1994) discusses the possibility that there were fewer kingdoms in 
Scandinavia at the end of the first millennium than there had been 200 years earlier when 
raiding activity began, noting further that while early Viking activity was largely the 
work of raiders, “…in the late tenth and eleventh centuries Scandinavian Kings led 
                                                 
10 These brief remarks certainly do not do justice to the many organizational changes instituted by Alfred. 
Abels (1988b: 79) writes: “The creation of the burghal system marks a watershed in the history of Anglo-
Saxon governance. Despite formidable obstacles, the West Saxon dynasty of the late 9
th and early 10
th 
century managed to oversee the construction of a network of fortified towns…”; the system and its 
development is a subject of some interest covered in great detail in Abels (1988b); see also Abel’s (1988a) 
book on Alfred the Great.    9
Viking raids…”
11 (Sawyer 1994: 144-5).  In England, the centralized controls and 
institutions enacted by Alfred were extended and further developed under Edward and 
Aethelstan; indeed, a variety of innovations appear for the first time in 10
th century 
English law. The trend towards larger political units was reflected in the newly emergent, 
broader definition of kingship.
12 Indeed, a sense of common identity had slowly emerged 
among the English in the face of the Viking raids, most dramatically reflected in the law 
codes of Wulfstan II, which declared that the English should follow one faith, under the 
leadership of one king (Keynes 1997).   
The 11
th century, the final years of the Viking age, was characterized by large-
scale invasions that more closely resembled exercises in empire building than raiding, 
and the native territories of both victims of raiding and the raiders themselves had 
evolved into larger kingdoms. Both Norway and Denmark had evolved into relatively 
unified kingdoms, albeit in fits and starts. The Danish kings Sven Forkbeard and Canute 
(Knut) the Great succeeded in building large, if short-lived, kingdoms, and William the 
Conqueror, the son of Vikings who had taken up residence in Normandy, conquered 
England (Poertner, 1971). The process which began with small scale raids had gone a 
long way in creating incentives for Europeans to organize themselves into larger 
countries, and therefore exercised a profound impact on the future shape of Europe. In the 
next section, we describe a simple formal model of this process. The cornerstone of the 
model is the idea that conflict involves some degree of scale economies.  
 
III.  The model  
  The agents in the model are divided into two separate populations: we shall call 
them Vikings and English.
13  For some historical reason (unspecified in the model) we 
assume that the former might prey on the latter, but that the reverse cannot happen.
14  
Consider a total population of n distinct Viking villages, each of which makes a decision 
about whether to engage in raiding or to pursue a peaceable occupation, such as farming. 
                                                 
11 As examples, Sawyer (1994: 144-5) notes the excursions of Sven Forkbeard, and adds of Knut: “He had 
a large fleet which he used to molest the world.” 
12 See Abels (1988a) for a detailed analysis of these institutions.   
13 An interesting extension, which we do not entertain for reasons of brevity, would be to consider the 
interaction between a raiding population and two defending populations, e. g., the British and Franks.  
14 Counterattacks did in fact occur, particularly when raiders spent extended periods of time in the host 
country, but were in any case rare.    10
Let the number of raiding villages be given by  v n  and the number of villages engaging in 
farming as  f n , so that  f v n n n + = .
15   
When engaging in raiding, Vikings randomly select an English target village. To 
successfully raid the target village, the raiders must overcome whatever defensive force 
the respective English village has in place; we refer to the size of the defensive force 
asD. In conducting raids, Vikings may wish to combine forces with other, like-minded 
Viking villages. Agglomeration into a larger raiding group conveys a distinct advantage – 
the massing of forces thus achieved admits a larger probability of successfully executing 
a raid. The downside is that a successful raiding group must split the returns thereby 
gained among its members.  
To make this idea concrete, let v denote the number of raiding villages 
participating in a given raiding coalition, and let g  denote the forces contributed by each 
village to the coalition. Then, the size of the raiding force amassed is  gv G = . In much of 
what follows, we shall assume that each group simply contributes all of its labor to 
raiding, which results in  v G = .
16 Note that since all groups are identical, they make 
identical decisions in equilibrium, so it follows that across the population of villages 
engaging in raiding, the number of distinct raiding coalitions is  v n V v / = .   
The likelihood a raid is successful is determined by a contest success function, 
which maps the relative size of the invading force and the size of the defensive force 
faced into a success probability. We assume that the contest success function is of the 







= ) , ( .         ( 1 )  
The function (1) is standard in the literature. For clarity, it is worth emphasizing 
the role of the parameter ρ , which Hirshleifer (1995) refers to as a decisiveness 
parameter.  Most of our results shall pertain to the case in which  1 > ρ . The assumption 
                                                 
15 An alternative approach, which generates virtually identical results, is to allow all groups to contribute 
some positive fraction of their labor to raiding and some to farming. 
16 This assumption, and generally, the assumption that raiding groups contribute a fixed amount to the 
raiding party is with little loss of generality. As detailed in the appendix, allowing for variable contributions 
from raiding groups to the joint effort does not substantially change our qualitative results.    11
1 > ρ  implies a certain degree of “decisiveness” in outcomes – conflicts do not evolve 
towards compromises where both parties share the contested prize, but are fought until 
either the British or the Vikings prevail (respectively retaining the prize or taking most of 
it).  For  ∞ → ρ  the contest function approaches a step function so that the slightly more 
powerful party wins the conflict with near certainty.  This is a plausible approximation as 
far as we can infer from historical sources.
17  This specification allows for increasing 
returns to force size to, for example, Vikings so long as  D G ≤ . Once the point  D G =  is 
reached, diminishing returns to force size set in (see also Skaperdas 1992).  A successful 
raid results in winnings of size π .
18 Using  v G = , the expected returns per village 








= .         ( 2 )  
In (2), r denotes the number of raids the coalition becomes engaged in per period, which 
we take to be exogenous, determined by the state of shipping technology.  So r is not a 
choice variable but the result of the interplay between technology – how fast can the 
Vikings travel between Scandinavia and British coasts? – and the time constraint.
19  
Note that the first part of expression (2) includes the idea that expected winnings are 
divided by the number of villages in the raiding group.
20  Success probabilities and 
payoffs as a function of conflict effort (given defense level d) are depicted in Figure 1.  
The inflection point (where the second derivative of the conflict function is 0) occurs at 
d[(ρ-1)/(ρ+1)]
1/ρ, while the maximum group returns occur at the point d[(ρ-1)]
1/ρ.  This 
                                                 
17 Hirshleifer (2000) discusses conditions and historical episodes under which one might expect the 
decisiveness parameter to be relatively high (such as in Naval battles) or relatively low.  
18 Since the contested prize, π, is treated as an exogenous parameter, the model is on the interface of 
conflict models and rent seeking models. As discussed by Neary (1997), most conflict models have a 
general equilibrium nature where agents contest the output they first produce themselves.  However, since 
British villages cannot opt out of the game unilaterally, the model is of the conflict and not of the rent-
seeking type. Also note that treating π as a parameter implies ignoring the fact that the British will have to 
accumulate wealth after being raided, so that in reality π(nv,v,D).  Such a model could, in theory, be solved 
for the length of the optimal raiding cycle, not unlike optimal cutting rotations in forestry (think of the 
traditional Faustmann model).  However, such a model is intractable when we allow for endogenous 
agglomeration, and detracts a bit from the main point that we wish to get across. Therefore, we leave this as 
an interesting option for future research in the context of a simpler model.  
19 In light of the evidence described in the previous section of the paper, it would seem important that a 
larger group should be able to conduct more raids. Allowing for this possibility makes things a bit messier, 
without fundamentally changing our results. We describe the impact of variable raids in the appendix.  
20 Note that we do not formally include any transactions costs associated with group formation. This is done 
purely for simplicity.  However, the impact on the results we obtain is relatively straightforward.   12
means the inflection point is always to the left of the maximum return point – you 
always want to be a little bit larger than the opponent. 
Optimal raiding group size is chosen to maximize the returns of the average 
































xv .   (3) 




) 1 ( − = .        ( 4 )  
Equation (4) describes the optimal size of the raiding group as an increasing 
function of the size of the defense force faced. Note that v>1 (so that more than one group 
bands together) requires  1 > ρ , implying that agglomeration into a larger raiding group 
will only takes place if the degree of decisiveness in conflict is sufficiently high.
21 












xv         ( 5 )  
Equations (4) and (5) imply that as the size of the defense, D, confronted grows, it 
becomes desirable for groups to form larger coalitions in raiding, while at the same time 
each member of the coalition receives less from raiding activities. Thus, a larger 
defensive force deters raiding behavior, while at the same time encouraging those groups 
that do engage in raiding to agglomerate into larger raiding units. One can already see 
how our model, in equilibrium, might allow for seemingly anomalous behaviors to occur 
simultaneously; it is plausible, for instance that a larger fraction of the raiding population 
might engage in peaceable activities while at the same time, raids that do occur will be 
larger and more sophisticated, in that they involve more highly agglomerated groups of 
attackers. (Out of equilibrium dynamics, as explored in the next section, are consistent 
with a broader range of outcomes, including increases in both raid size, v, as well as 
raiding activity, nv, in general.) To determine explicitly the size of the raiding population, 
                                                 
21 If  1 < ρ , the incentives for invaders are to break up into raiding parties as small as possible.    13
suppose that (agricultural) production in Scandinavia is governed by a production 
function of the form:  
Q =
α αR An f
− 1 ,          ( 6 )  
where R is the common resource base used in production.  Home production is subject to 
crowding; in accordance with this, suppose that there is free access to the means of 
production in Scandinavia, so each group gets its average product from land production.  
















x .        ( 7 )  
In equilibrium, returns from engaging in raiding and engaging in farming must be 
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R n nv .        ( 9 )  
One interpretation of (9) is as a sufficient condition for the onset of raiding 
activity, given that the English are unprepared for raiding. For example, assume the 
English have some initial amount of defense D.  Upon substituting this into the above 
























nv .        ( 1 0 )  
From (10) one can see that raiding is more likely to commence the greater the 
population of the raiding country (an increase in n), the fewer the resources or poorer the 
environment in Scandinavia (a fall in R ), the worst the technology/productivity of land 
on the home front (a decrease in  A), the greater the profitability of raiding (an increase in   14
π ), and the easier it is to conduct raids (an increase in r ). One might interpret historians’ 
“land thirst” and “better shipping technology” arguments as a decrease in R or an increase 
in r, respectively; further, as described an increase in population n also makes raiding 
more likely, in line with the hypothesis that overpopulation was a cause of increased 
raiding. Finally, raising α (or lowering the value marginal product of labor in domestic 
production) also provides an impetus for raiding. 
We can use (9) to solve for a critical level of defenses that would deter conflict.  
Upon setting nv=0 we can also solve for this threshold level as: 
1 / ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
− ρ − ρ α ϕ − ρ π = A R r n D .  That is, if the British are able to muster defense levels 
equal to  D D ≥  then raiding would becomes and unprofitable activity and Danes would 
specialize in domestic production. 
Let us now consider the decisions of the defending population. They must decide 
how much to invest in defending their resources, and the group size they should 
agglomerate into in order to best deal with invaders. What we have in mind is a situation 
in which a cluster of English villages decides to combine each of their individual 
defensive resources (their local armies) into one large force, which is deployed to the 
necessary place when any village in the coalition of defensive villages is raided. Define e 
as the size of the defending coalition, or the number of villages pooling forces. 
In this case, there is an obvious possibility that group members may attempt to 
free-ride on the efforts of others in the coalition. The defense problem is different than 
the offender’s problem in that members of a coalition have an incentive to cheat and free-
ride; one example might be refusing to provide defending forces when a fellow coalition 
member is attacked. There must be some sort of institution in place that “coerces” 
members of a defensive coalition to participate in the collective defense of its members.
22 
Suppose that the total costs of managing a coalition of size e can be written as 
0 , 0 ), ( > ′ ′ > ′ C C e Ce . The total administrative costs are borne equally among all 
participating villages so costs per village of managing the coalition are  e e C e c e e / ) ( ) ( = ; 
under the assumptions governing the shape of the cost function,  ) (e ce  is also increasing 
                                                 
22 Transactions costs are much less important to raiders, it can be argued, because if they do not participate 
as described by group rules, they can be excluded from winnings. There is, put another way, a much 
smaller intertemporal participation problem.    15
in the size of the coalition. Denote the losses (assets stolen and property damaged) 
experienced by the typical village in the event of a successful attack as π (also the amount 
seized by attackers in a successful raid) and the size of the average invading force as G , 
which is taken as given by defenders when the size of the coalition is determined. 
Suppose that the typical defending group experiences r ~  raids. Per village, total expected 











π .        ( 1 2 )  
Defenders choose e to minimize (6) given d  (the defense contribution per village), 
which we normalize to unity (again, see the appendix for a more elaborate specification 
with free choice of both e and d). It is easiest to transform this into a problem in which 
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π .        ( 1 3 )  
If attacks are randomly distributed among English villages, and there are  v nv / 
distinct raiding coalitions which each carry out r  raids, we have  ) /( ~
e v vn rn r = .  Thus, 
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Equation (14) permits a closed-form solution only for specific functional forms. 
In the case that the total costs of maintaining a defensive coalition of size e are given by 
) ln( ) ( e ce e C =  –– so that  0 '> C  and  0 ' ' > C  still hold –– and administrative costs are 
borne equally by all villages, then  ) ln( / ) ( e c e e C =  defines administrative costs per 
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Solving (15) for e gives:  
ρ ρπ ρπ ρπ
1
2
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v e     (16)   16
Figure 2 provides a graph of the reaction function, showing the optimal level of 
agglomeration e as a function of  v n  and v.  It is evident that the optimal level of defense 
is increasing in both the number of raids and the number of Viking villages involved in 
the attacks. 
We shall see that using (4), (9), and (16), we can describe a simple dynamic 
model of the process of agglomeration in conflict. Before doing so, it is worthwhile to 
consider what the simultaneous solution of (4), (9), and (16) tells us about the size and 
scale of defense and raiding activities. A closed-form solution can be obtained for the 
special case when  1 = α , or when the opportunity cost of raiding effort is invariant with 


































= . (17) 
  A first observation from (17) is the way in which the costs of agglomeration in the 
defending country (which might be taken to represent the talents of a particular king) 
influence the equilibrium levels of agglomeration in the defending country, and 
simultaneously determine the size of raiding groups in the invading country. As 
administrative costs increase, the size of defending groups falls, the number of Vikings 
participating in raiding rises, while the size of the raiding group falls. Population 
increases in the invading country also ultimately cause increases in the organization of 
defenders and raiding groups. The logic is that defenders must become more organized 
to deal with the increased threat of raiding; Vikings then face an incentive to increase the 
size of their armies to overcome the more concerted defenses. One can also see from (17) 
that equilibrium agglomeration of raiders and defenders increases as the winnings to 
successful raids occur (an increase in π ). An interpretation of this result is that increased 
commercial activity in Northern Europe increased incentives for raiding, which in turn 
resulted in larger English political units and larger Viking armies.  
 
4. Adding Dynamics 
  The solutions described in equation (17) summarize the equilibrium of the Nash 
game between invaders and their victims. An equally interesting issue concerns the   17
development trajectories towards the equilibrium – do we obtain intertemporal patterns 
that fit stylized facts well so that, over time, coalitions of Vikings and English grew 
larger?   
Putting the model above in a dynamic context implies, strictly speaking, that we 
can distinguish between three different state variables: Viking coalition size (v), 
Defenders’ coalition size (e) and the number of Viking villages engaged in raiding (nv).
23  
While it is possible to track such a model over time, it is also cumbersome and defies 
straightforward representation in a simple (two dimensional) phase plane.  For this 
reason, and because the qualitative results are unaffected, we simplify the model by 
assuming that the Vikings are able to instantaneously cluster into invasive groups of the 
optimal size.  Hence, v=v*(e), as derived in (4), holds always.  Note that this does not 
mean that coalition size is stable: it varies over time as the size of the defensive coalition 
changes (also note that the number of coalitions varies, as discussed below). 
Now, turn to the dynamic equations of the model.  First, consider the clustering 
process of the Vikings. It is reasonable to assume that people respond to profit 
differentials between agriculture and raiding by switching from less to more profitable 
occupations, but it is also reasonable to assume that such responses only occur with a 
time lag. There may be many reasons why switching is not immediate, some rooted in 
psychology and others caused by matters like incomplete information, transaction costs, 
and so on. Given the choice of the optimal coalition size, the dynamics of the labor 








































,    (18) 
where φ is an adjustment or sluggishness parameter, measuring the speed with which 
“switching” occurs in response to profit differentials.  In equilibrium, returns from 
engaging in raiding and engaging in farming must be equal, and equation (9) simply 
provides the dnv/dt=0 isocline. 
                                                 
23 Note that the number of “victim villages”— ne – is exogenous and fixed: the British cannot choose to opt 
out of the game – although they certainly would have liked to!    18
Similarly, we may expect that defenders will cluster in defensive coalitions if this 
is profitable for them, and that coalitions continue to grow as long as having additional 
members increases the payoff of all members.  Again, the pace at which this happens is 
arbitrary, and we may specify the dynamics as: 
   
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 
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where ξ is an adjustment or sluggishness parameter.  In equilibrium, the marginal gain of 
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Figure 3 combines the isoclines (9) and (20) in a phase plane, and also displays 
how Viking coalition size develops (the lower quadrant).  From Figure 3, three results 
stand out.  First, starting from a ‘decentralized beginning’ without significant cooperation 
between like-minded villages – i.e. close to the origin in the southwest part of the phase 
plane – we see that nv, v and e all grow over time.  The number of Viking villages ‘going 
a-Viking’ increases because raiding is a relatively profitable occupation, and these extra 
efforts are ‘matched’ to a certain extent by the English who cluster in more powerful 
defense coalitions.  In response, the Vikings also cluster in larger groups, providing a 
further impetus for the English to expand coalition size. 
  Second, the number of Viking villages engaged in the raids need not 
monotonously increase over time. Figure 3 provides one such non-monotonous 
trajectory: while coalition size on both sides of the battle field continues to increase, 
profits from raiding fall so that some Danes find it in their interest to return to farming.  
However, alternative outcomes are also feasible. For different initial values or parameters 
the system displays a monotonous approach or cyclical behavior – the equilibrium may 
be a node or focus.  In case of “cycles” the size of Danish and English coalitions goes up 
and down – suggesting an ebb-and-tide pattern of unilateral conflict.  From a theoretical 
viewpoint, therefore, a rich set of results is feasible, and it is unfortunate that the 
historical record is not detailed enough to select the most appropriate outcome.  We   19
believe that both the node and focus outcome may be consistent with what is known 
about this era.
24  
Third, while strictly speaking beyond the boundaries of the model, we can use the 
model to say something about the final phase of the Viking era – the transition from 
raiding and marauding to other activities such as trade.   It is evident that effort will shift 
from raiding to farming if (due to some exogenous process such as the conversion to 
Christianity) the benefits from pillaging and destruction, as represented by the parameter 
π, become smaller.  This rotates the dnv/dt=0 isocline clockwise.  Similarly, effort will be 
re-allocated away from raiding if English’ institutions develop so that coordination costs 
c are reduced (rotating the de/dt=0 isocline clockwise).   For sufficiently large changes in 
π and c pillaging all but disappears.  On a more speculative note, it could be argued that 
after the stage was set for agglomeration into sufficiently large “states,” the perspective 
of the decision makers changed.  That is, the affairs and interests of the nation-state, 
rather than the benefits of a bunch of independent armies, took primacy.  This could 
induce greater emphasis on matters like mutually beneficial trade.
25 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
  Decisiveness in conflict and the Vikings forged modern Europe by setting in 
motion forces that led to agglomeration and larger nation-states; on both sides. For 
example, it is unlikely that Alfred could have conducted his centralization plan without 
the interventions of the Vikings, and the gradual escalation in the size and nature of 
conflict during the early Viking age certainly aided in setting the stage for the 
achievements of Knut (Canute the Great), and William the Conqueror.  
  The idea that war and defense are linked to the size of nations is not new.  Alesina 
and Spolaore (2005a,b), for example, argue that the size of countries is determined by a 
need to balance “heterogeneity costs” (associated with jurisdictional expansion) and scale 
                                                 
24 The empirical facts are rather obscure on this matter.  For example, it is hard to determine whether more 
or less Viking villages got involved in the raids over time as the Viking era drew to a close.  While we 
know that raiding coalitions got larger throughout most (but perhaps not all) of the Viking era, this could be 
more than offset by a decline in the number of coalitions. 
25 Alternatively, one could introduce a third activity (such as “trading”) into the model from the outset.  
While perhaps not competitive at early stages, trading may become more attractive over time as seafaring 
technologies improved through some learning-by-doing process (lowering transaction costs of this activity, 
and allowing it to eventually dominate the others).     20
economies that come with the provision of public goods provision such as defense effort.  
They show that the number of countries should increase in response to a reduction in the 
probability of conflict but that, in turn, the increase in number of independent nations 
may result in a greater number of conflicts.
26  We have shown that fixed costs of public 
good provision are not necessary to achieve consolidation in larger political units.   
Instead, we look at the conflict technology, which introduces a competitive aspect to 
agglomeration that we feel is novel.  It links the inherently static literature on optimal 
nation size to the dynamic literature on arms races.  
  Of course the model is a highly stylized and incomplete representation of reality.  
A number of extensions are feasible.  For example, it would be interesting to include 
population dynamics, in particular because changes in the population affect potential 
strength on the battlefield.  Alternatively, explicitly accounting for the wealth generation 
process of the victims may be a useful avenue of future research – accounting for the fact 
that increasing defensive efforts reduces the speed with which assets may be 
accumulated, and accounting for the fact that the time lag between successive attacks 
affects the available loot.  Third, one could consider the challenges facing multiple 
populations (such as Franks and English) confronted by a common threat might be 
interesting, as well as more explicitly considering game theoretic aspects of the 
agglomeration problem.  However, work along these lines suffers from the drawback that 








                                                 
26 They also demonstrate that this implies that the peace dividend may be smaller than perhaps anticipated.   21
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Appendix  
A. Varying invasive effort levels.  
  We first describe how varying invasive effort levels alter the basic nature of the 
problem. The main result of interest is that allowing invading groups to vary their level of 
activity alongside the agglomeration decision does not qualitatively change the 
participation function and the returns from engaging in conflict, so long as one includes 
some degree of increasing costs for each group to raiding. The logic behind this result is 
that no individual raiding group would wish to agglomerate into a larger group if it could 
increase its size without disproportionately increasing its costs.  
  Along these lines, consider the modified returns-to-raiding function after (2); 












.        ( A . 1 )  
  To take a specific example, suppose that 
2 ) ( g c g c g = . Differentiating (A.1) with 
respect to both g  and v (which implies that invasive effort can be chosen so as to 
maximize the returns from raiding of the average group member), and solving the 





























=      (A.2) 
  The solutions in (A.2) imply that the overall size of the raiding group,  gv G = , 
can be readily shown to be the same as that given in equation (4). Substituting the 




















=        ( A . 3 )  
  The expression in (A.3) has the same qualitative properties as the return function 
used in equation (9) to derive equilibrium raiding participation; thus, the qualitative 
characteristics are not altered by the simplifying assumption that raiding effort is fixed. It 
is, however, of some interest to note that closed form solutions for reaction functions are 
still obtainable in this case.  
   24
B. Varying levels of defensive effort  
  Consider now a case in which we allow defending groups to invest in variable 
amounts of defense, for a given amount of raids. This gives a total raiding cost function 
of the form:  
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) (
~ d c e c
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π ,       ( A . 4 )  
Which means that we have the following first-order conditions:  
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Together, these two conditions imply that the following must hold:  
 ) ( ) ( e c e d d c e d ′ = ′ ,         ( A . 7 )  
  Note that in the case we explored in the text, where  ) ln( ) ( e c e c e e = , this would 
imply that  e d c d d c = ′ ) (,  s o  t h a t  d  would be set at a constant level, regardless of the level 
of agglomeration across groups. In a more general case, results still would not 
substantially alter our approach. For example, if we supposed that 
1 ) (
− = d d d
d d c d c λ
λ , and 
1 ) (
− = e e e
d e c e c λ
λ , (A.7) implies that 
d d d c e c d e
λ λ = , or 
d d e
d e c c e d
λ λ λ / 1 / ) / ( = . Plugging 
this into (A.5) gives the following:   
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Expression (A.8) is a more complex version of (13), though it has the same basic 
properties.  
 
C. Larger groups can conduct more raids. 
In the historical record, it appears that some of the larger Viking armies stayed 
together for substantial amounts of time; therefore, a logical extension is to consider a 
situation in which a larger army can stay together for longer periods of time and conduct 
more raids over this period of time. This would also allow the size of the prize to expand   25
with the number of groups. Along these lines, one might replace expression (2) with 








=         ( A . 9 )  
In expression (A.9), the term 
γ rv ,  1 0 < ≤ γ  describes how the number of raids 
expands as group size expands, where now r  denotes the number of raids that can be 
conducted by a raiding group composed of a single village. Under these circumstances, 
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The raiding returns described in (A.11) have the same basic functional form as the 
returns described in (A.5), except for being a bit less responsive to changes in D. 
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Figure 2: The reaction function of the defending population 
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Figure 3: Dynamics of Viking raiding effort and coalition size, and prey coalition size: 
One possible trajectory. 
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